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Abstract
This note exhibits sufficient conditions concerning the skills of old workers ruling out
overaccumulation stationnary equilibria in an OLG model with productive capital. Using a
Cobb−Douglas economy, we show that such conditions seem to be largely fullfilled in the
industrialized countries.
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In an overlapping generation model, Diamond (1965) showed that an economy can
reach a steady state with capital over-accumulation. Such an economy is said to
be dynamically ineﬃcient since a Pareto-improvement can be achieved by allowing
the current generation to devour a portion of the capital stock and leaving the
consumption of all future generations intact.
This result, further improved by Galor and Ryder (1991), has motivated a large
body of research. Indeed, several authors have elaborated on the nature of that
ineﬃciency. Weil (1989) examined the role of ﬁnite horizons. Tirole (1985) showed
that rational bubbles on assets bringing a real rent appear in dynamically ineﬃ-
cient situations. Thibault (2000) focuses on altruistic preferences, while Abel et al.
(1989) and Dechert and Yamamoto (1992) extend Diamond’s result to the case of
uncertainty.
We shed light on a crucial assumption of the standard OLG model: agents do not
work during their second period of life. This strong hypothesis has been ﬁrst noted
by Blanchard (1985), when comparing his perpetual youth model to Diamond’s one.
The present note follows the idea originally contained (but not fully developed) in
Blanchard (1985).1 Indeed, by contrast to Diamond (1965), we consider a very
simple OLG model in which agents work during their second period of life. We
assume age-speciﬁc labor productivity which is related to the age-earnings proﬁle
studied in labor economics. Contrary to the Blanchard model, such a framework is
tractable and allows to encompass most of the Diamond models.
As the wage income of the second period increases, the intuition suggests that
savings decrease. Therefore, the more productive the old workers, the lower the
capital stock, and the higher the interest factor. The paper builds on this intuition
and presents general technologies and preferences under which it is correct. In par-
ticular, we exhibit suﬃcient conditions ruling out dynamic ineﬃciency if the labor
productivity of old agents is suﬃciently strong. Finally, using a Cobb-Douglas econ-
omy we show that such conditions seem to be largely fullﬁlled in the industrialized
countries.
2 The model
Consider a perfectly competitive economy which extends over inﬁnite discrete time.
Individuals are identical within as well as across generations and live for two periods.
In each period t, Nt individuals are born and the population grows at rate n>−1.
Agents work throughout their life. Young (old) are endowed with one (1+γ) unit(s)
of labor. Hence, γ ≥− 1 is the age-speciﬁc labor productivity component. The
1Recently, Decreuse (2001) provides an altruistic interpretation to the Blanchard (1985) per-
petual youth model.
1period t wage per eﬃcient unit of labor is wt. Young born at time t earn wt,
consume ct and save st. When old they consume, dt+1, both their labor earnings
(1 + γ)wt+1 and the proceeds of their savings Rt+1st. Agents thus face the following
budget constraints:
wt = ct + st and (1 + γ)wt+1 + Rt+1st = dt+1 (1)
An agent born at t maximizes his life cycle utility U(ct,d t+1) subject to (1).
Assumption 1 U(c,d) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, monotonically increas-







Moreover, both periods’consumption goods c and d are normal.
The output produced at time t using two inputs, capital Kt and eﬃcient labor
Lt = Nt + Nt−1 (1 + γ), is governed by a production function with constant returns
to scale F(Kt,L t)=Ltf(kt), where kt ≡ Kt/Lt.
Assumption 2 f is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, positive, strictly increasing,









Each factor is paid its marginal product. Assuming that capital fully depreciates
after one period, we obtain:
wt = w(kt)=f(kt) − ktf
 (kt) and Rt = R(kt)=f
 (kt) (2)
The capital stock of period t + 1 is ﬁnanced by the savings of period t:
(1 + n)kt+1 = st (3)
3 The results
The saving function s is given by:
st = argmax
s U(wt − s,Rt+1s +( 1+γ)wt+1) ≡ s(wt,(1 + γ)wt+1,R t+1) (4)
Under Assumption 1, s(.,.,.) is increasing with respect to the ﬁrst argument
and decreasing with respect to the second argument. Intuitively, the higher the
wage income of the second period, the lower the savings. Hence, an increase of the
labor productivity of old agents tends to lower savings. If the substitution eﬀect
dominates the income eﬀect, s is increasing with respect to the interest factor.
2Deﬁnition 1 A steady state is a stationary capital/labor ratio  k which satisﬁes:
 k = φ(γ, k)/(1 + n), where φ(γ,k)=s(w(k),(1 + γ)w(k),R(k))
In order to evaluate the eﬃciency properties of stationary equilibria, we extend
Galor and Ryder’s (1989) existence results to the case where there are old workers.
Proposition 1 There is a steady state with a positive capital stock if k0 > 0 and:




f  (k)[s3 − (1 + γ)ks2] − (1 + n)
> 1.
Moreover, the steady state is unique and globally stable if:
(iii) the unique function Λ such that kt+1 =Λ ( kt) is strictly concave.
Proof.2 According to (2), (3) and (4) we obtain Π(kt,k t+1)=s(w(kt),(1+γ)w(kt+1),
R(kt+1)) − (1 + n)kt+1 = 0. According to (i), Π2(.,.) < 0 and using the implicit
functions theorem, there exists a single valued function Λ such that kt+1 =Λ ( kt).
We have Λ(kt)=ktf  (kt)s1/Π2(kt,k t+1) > 0. From obvious economics arguments,3
Λ(0) = 0. Condition (ii) guarantees that the function Λ is steeper than the 45◦ line
at the origin, and since lim
k→+∞
f
 (k) = 0 implies that lim
k→+∞
Λ(k)/k = 0, there exists
at least a ˜ k>0 such that Λ(˜ k)=˜ k. Hence ˜ k is a steady state. Moreover, the strict
concavity of Λ implies the uniqueness and global stability of ˜ k. 
Consider the resource constraint of the whole economy: xt = f(kt)−(1+n)kt+1
where xt =( Ntct + Nt−1dt)/(Nt + Nt−1(1 + γ)) is the period t consumption per
eﬃcient unit of labor. The stationary consumption ﬂow is maximized whenever
R =1+n, i.e. at the golden rule. As usual the economy can be Pareto-improved
when R is greater than 1 + n by simply making the young reduce their savings.
Deﬁnition 2 A steady state  k is dynamically eﬃcient if and only if R( k) ≥ 1+n.
We ﬁrst extend the theoretical result provided by Galor and Ryder (1991) (Corol-
lary 1) in the case of γ = −1. Indeed, if the golden rule level of capital, k∗ =
f −1(1 + n), is greater than the upper bound of the attainable per-capita capital, ˘ k
(i.e. f(˘ k)=( 1+n)˘ k), steady state equilibria are dynamically eﬃcient4. We can
reﬁne this result. Let kD be the highest Diamond equilibrium (obviously kD < ˘ k).
Then, steady state equilibria5 are dynamically eﬃcient if kD ≤ k∗.
2It is a simple extension of the results provided by Galor and Ryder (1989) in case of γ = −1.
3Homogenous preferences prevent agents from getting into debt. Hence 0 ≤ st ≤ wt ≤ f(kt).
If kt = 0, since 0 ≤ (1 + n)kt+1 ≤ f(kt) and lim
k→0
f(k) = 0 we have kt+1 = 0 i.e. Λ(0) = 0.
4Under Assumption 2 there exists an upper bound to attainable capital, ˘ k. Since st <w t <
f(kt)w eh a v eφ(γ,k) <f(k). Hence all the steady states lie in [0,˘ k).
5As φγ(γ,k) < 0, if the model has a steady state, the Diamond model has a steady state.
3We now study the impact of the age-earnings proﬁle on the dynamic eﬃciency
of steady states. This analyze, of course, requires a classical framework in which the
steady state is a single-valued function of γ for all γ ∈ [−1,+∞).
Proposition 2 Assume (i), (ii), (iii) of proposition 1 are satisﬁed for all γ ≥− 1.
Then: (a) the economy experiences a unique steady state  k.
(b) there exists a unique  γ ≥− 1 such that ˆ k is dynamically eﬃcient if and
only if γ ≥ ˆ γ.
Proof. Assertion (a) follows directly from proposition 1.
(b) Let k be given. According to (1) and Assumption 1, for all γ ≥− 1, φ(γ,k) ∈
(−
(1+γ)w(k)
R(k) ,w(k)). Hence, φ(−1,k) ∈ (0,w(k)). Moreover, φγ(γ,k)=w(k)s2 < 0.
Let ψ(s,γ)=−Uc(w(k)−s,R(k)s+(1+γ)w(k))+R(k)Ud(w(k)−s,R(k)s+(1+
γ)w(k)). For all γ, φ(γ,k) solves ψ(φ(γ,k),γ) = 0. Assume that φ(γ,k) ≥ 0 for any
γ. Then, from Assumption 1, lim
γ→+∞ψ(φ(γ,k),γ) < 0, which is impossible. There-
fore, since φγ(γ,k) < 0w eh a v e l i m




ˆ k ≤ 0. Since ˆ k>0, lim
γ→+∞
ˆ k = 0. Hence lim
γ→+∞f
 (ˆ k)=+ ∞. Thus,
there exists a unique  γ ≥− 1 above which R( k) ≥ 1+n. 
As the productivity of old workers increases, the savings motive dies down, and
the stationary interest factor rises. Hence, for any given population growth rate,
the steady state is (dynamically) eﬃcient if old workers are suﬃciently productive.
More precisely, if the Diamond equilibrium kD is eﬃcient then the equilibrium is
always eﬃcient and ˆ γ = −1. Conversly, if kD is ineﬃcient, then ˆ γ>−1.
4 A Cobb-Douglas illustration
Consider a Cobb-Douglas economy described by:
U (c,d)=β lnc +( 1− β)lnd, f (k)=Ak
α, where A>0,α ∈ (0,1) and β ∈ (0,1)


















Therefore, the unique steady-state is dynamically eﬃcient if and only if:
1+γ ≥
(1 − β)(1− α) − α
α + β(1 − α)
(1 + n)
4In the Diamond case, the condition of dynamic eﬃciency does not depend on
n. Hence, the weight of the ﬁrst period consumption in the utility function and
the elasticity of the production function w.r.t. the capital stock must be suﬃciently
high. The more general framework needs that γ is suﬃciently high.
Consider an economy endowed with the following characteristics: (i) the lifetime
horizon at birth is 70 years, divided in two periods of 35 years, (ii) the growth rate
of the population is 1% per year, which means 35% per period, (iii) α = .35, (iv)
β =
1
1+( 0 .975)35 (implying a 2.5% psychological discount rate on an annual basis).
Then the condition of dynamic eﬃciency is, γ greater or equal to ˆ γ = −.83.
This condition is largely fullﬁlled in the industrialized countries where the time
path of wage earnings strictly increases. This conclusion is in line with the empirical
evidence established by Abel et al (1989) and remains valid if we authorize the agents
to be retired during part of their second period of life. Indeed, individuals spend at
least their 15 ﬁrst years at school.
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